Minnesota's pay-for-performance pilot

As part of its effort to create a pay-for-performance pilot, Minnesota recently released a request for information that asks the public to submit information in response to multiple questions about the potential design of a pilot program. The state has expressed willingness to issue bonds up to $10 million to finance the pay-for-performance pilot. The RFI asks for feedback on programs in workforce development and supportive housing. There are several similarities to, and differences from, the pay-for-success model that is currently being designed by Massachusetts.

- Minnesota has issued two RFIs, one for service providers and another for third parties. - Massachusetts issued one RFI, but two RFPs, asking service providers and intermediaries to apply separately for the invitation to negotiate with the state. One purpose of this separation was to avoid a situation where the intermediary entered into an exclusive relationship with a suboptimal service provider, or vice-versa. A downside of this separation was that it was much harder for the intermediary to create, plan, and describe a potential program delivery model without knowing for sure which service provider's model it would ultimately use. Minnesota seems further removed from this decision. It currently seeks responses that would inform its program design, rather than RFP responses from which it would select its preferred service providers and third parties.

- Minnesota's RFI mentions that the state might play the role of an evaluator. The Massachusetts RFP did not discuss that option. If the state commissions the social outcome, agrees to pay for it, and evaluates the service providers' success in achieving that outcome, then it will have to manage a perceived - and perhaps a real - conflict of interest.

 - The bond. Minnesota is interested in issuing a bond to pay service providers for successful achievement of social outcomes. Here is the logic of issuing a bond, as I understand it. The service providers' program would reduce costs or increase revenues to the state. These financial benefits would appear in the state's budget during the service providers' program and after the program; service provision will create other benefits, as well, but they may not appear on the budget at all. Massachusetts and Minnesota have chose two different options for paying for all these benefits. Massachusetts has requested budgetary authorization (for $50 million) to pay service providers if they achieve predetermined outcomes. Minnesota has chosen to issue a bond (for $10 million) to pay service providers if they achieve their outcomes. Minnesota will presumably repay the bond at least in part from the financial benefits that the service providers' programs created.

 - Service providers' funding gap. In the proposed designs of both states, service providers will need to self-finance or raise external capital to fund the implementation of the program. The state pays only when - and if - predetermined outcomes have been achieved. In both cases, there is an opportunity for private capital to fund social outcomes.

Sources
- Minnesota Third Party RFI
- Minnesota Service Provider RFI